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FEDERAL RULES OF PUBLICATIONEIGHTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THE
PORTION OF EIGHTH CIRCUIT RULE

28A(I)

WHICH SAYS THAT UNPUBLISHED

OPINIONS ARE NOT PRECEDENT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL-ANASTAFOFF

V.

223 F.3D 898
CIR. 2000)

UNITED STATES,
(8TH

Catherine K. Rentzel*

HE Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently shocked the legal
community by finding a commonplace non-publication rule unconstitutional in Anastasoff v. United States, a seemingly bland
"Mailbox Rule" case.' Rule 28A(i), the rule governing unpublished
opinions in the Eighth Circuit, allows a court to disregard precedent set in
those opinions. 2 According to Anastasoff, this practice removes a limitation on the judiciary intended by the Constitution's framers and imposed
from the beginnings of our legal system. 3 The implications of this decision could potentially reach as far as the Supreme Court. Rules allowing
unpublished opinions to be disregarded as authority have been in place
since 1964 and are relatively entrenched in the U.S. judiciary. While the
Eighth Circuit boldly and wisely declared Rule 28A(i) unconstitutional,
Anastasoff omits many pressing policy concerns in favor of a more temperate, but weaker, approach.
The facts of the case are deceptively simple. On April 13, 1996, Faye
Anastasoff, the plaintiff and appellant, mailed her refund claim for taxes
paid on April 15, 1993, to the Internal Revenue Service. 4 The IRS balked
at this request, citing 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b), a rule which limits refunds to
those claims filed within three years of the tax payment. 5 The claim,
* The author would like to thank Cathy Rentzel, Chris Rentzel, Sarah Rentzel,
Martha Hardwick, Chad Robinson and Gabe Vazquez, for their support and assistance
during the writing of this article.
1. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 899 (citing 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i)).

3. Id. at 900.
4. Id. at 899.
5. Id.

2185

2186

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

though mailed within the required time period, did not actually arrive at
the IRS offices until April 16, 1996, one day past the three-year time
limit. 6
Anastasoff filed suit in federal district court, alleging that under the
"Mailbox Rule," 26 U.S.C. § 7502, her refund claim had arrived on time. 7
However, the IRS responded that the "Mailbox Rule," which measures
time of receipt based on the date of posting, did not apply. 8 The IRS
argued that the "Mailbox Rule" only governed situations in which the
claim itself was not timely, and the court had determined that Anastasoff's claim was received on time. 9 Anastasoff argued that the rule's
purpose was to relieve taxpayers from responsibility for the post office's
mistakes. 10 Most importantly, Anastasoff claimed that an unpublished
opinion decided in 1992 did not bind the court according to Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i)."
The district court ruled in favor of the IRS. 1 2 It held that the "Mailbox
Rule" only applied to claims that were untimely. 13 Both parties agreed
that the claim was "timely" under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a), so, under the
court's analysis, Anastasoff's claim was not subject to the "Mailbox
Rule." In reaching this conclusion, the court did not draw from the matter of the 1992 case, Christie v. United States, which was directly on
point. 14 As Rule 28A(i) required, the court did not regard the unpub5
lished opinion as precedent.'
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals echoed the district court's analysis, but it relied on Christie as mandatory authority in spite of its unpublished status.' 6 Christie held that the "Mailbox Rule" would not apply to
a late tax refund. 17 After quickly striking down the plaintiff's claim as an
overextension of the "Mailbox Rule," the court departed from the issue
immediately at hand to declare the use of unpublished opinions unconstitutional.' 8 Rule 28A(i), which allowed and regulated these unpublished
opinions, "purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the 'judicial,"' according to the court.' 9 By concealing potential
precedents in unpublished opinions, courts release themselves from the
controls of the past intended by the framers. Ultimately, Anastasoff is a
landmark opinion because of its holding on unpublished opinions; for
6. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446
(8th Cir. Nov. 20, 1997)).
15. Id.
16. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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both this article and the future, the "Mailbox Rule" portion of the opinion is insignificant in comparison.
Ironically, precedent itself controlled the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' view that opinions, whether published or unpublished, should be
binding authority. Judge Richard Arnold, writing for the court of ap21
peals,2 0 began his opinion by citing the venerable Marbury v. Madison,
along with another case from the early 1800s, Cohens v. Virginia.22 These
cases establish that because law has a cumulative effect, opinions of the
future must correlate to opinions of the past. 23 Arnold looked next to
original intent, asserting that the eighteenth century writings of Blackstone and Coke informed the framers' notions of how judicial power
would be checked. According to Blackstone, judges are "not delegated
to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old."' 24 Arnold
pointed out that both James Madison and Alexander Hamilton's writings
support his claim, as Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78 that "it is
indispensible that [judges] should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them ...."25
Although the theories of precedent in Anastasoff are steeped in history, the need to follow precedent remains today. Rule 28A(i) gives the
courts the power to pick and choose which cases they will follow, and
that, the Eighth Circuit says, expands judicial power beyond acceptable
limits. 2 6 Judicial holdings are intended to be "based on reason, not
fiat."'27 Notably, Anastasoff points out that not all opinions must be published, but insists that all must be binding as precedent. 28 Of course, as
with published opinions, unpublished opinions may be overruled, but
courts should be held accountable for their past decisions. 29 Precedent
provides a strong foundation for Anastasoff, but the Eighth Circuit
should have supported its opinion through policy rationale.
20. Arnold had written a journal article about a year before Anastasoff was decided
detailing his concerns about unpublished opinions. Richard S. Arnold, Essay, Unpublished
Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS. 219, 220 (1999). He said the topic
"disturb[ed] [him] so much that it [was] hard to know where to begin discussing it." Id. at

222. Interestingly, his article took on a much more strident tone than did Anastasoff.
While he cited very old legal authority in Anastasoff, he relied solely on newer material

and policy rationale in his journal article. Whether he could not resist the irony of using
venerable precedent to protect precedent in his opinion or was merely attempting to use
unassailable authority is uncertain. However, Anastasoff would probably be more persua-

sive to other courts had it incorporated some of the journal article's reasoning.
21. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899-900 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)).
22. Id. at 900 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821)).

23. Id. at 900.
24. Id. at 900 (quoting 1
69 (1975)).

SIR WILLIAM
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BLACKSTONE,
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LAWS OF ENGLAND

25. Id. at 902 (quoting
ern Library ed., 1938)).

THE FEDERALIST

26. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905.

27. Id. at 904.
28. Id.
29. Id.

No. 78, at 510 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mod-
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Anastasoff would have been a stronger opinion had it attacked the primary reason for the use of unpublished opinions: efficiency. 30 Courts
have not been troubled by the potential unconstitutionality of the nonpublication rules in the last thirty-five years and the Eighth Circuit missed
its opportunity to explain why these constitutional concerns now outweigh high-volume cost concerns. Had the Eighth Circuit placed itself on
the cutting edge of legal technology by discounting efficiency as a worry
from a bygone era, other circuit courts might now find it easier to follow
its lead. As Anastasoff cast non-publication solely as a constitutional issue, other courts might bristle at the suggestion that they had missed such
a glaring error in their own systems and, thus be much less receptive to
change. Also, evaluating its rule change as a product of the changing
times rather than a sudden realization of a long-term wrong would make
the Eighth Circuit's tardiness in handing down this ruling seem more
understandable.
In fact, technology has altered the legal profession, and the Eighth Circuit should have noted that the handling of unpublished opinions has
much less impact on efficiency in modern times, rendering Rule 28A(i)
much less necessary. Selective non-publication was originally intended to
cut costs, as headnoting, citing, and printing expenses were passed on to
clients through lawyers who bought the reporters containing the opinions. 3 1 Currently, even unpublished opinions are published on-line, so
this cost-cutting rationale is invalid. 32 However, a judge may save time
with non-publication: a minimal amount of reasoning must be written
into the case if it will not be cited as precedent, and perfect clarity for the
future is unnecessary. 33 Without publication as a means of quality control, though, judges spend less time on the writing of the opinions. 34 As
any writer can attest, writing helps to isolate inconsistencies in one's reasoning and can even change the writer's mind, especially in the case of a
court opinion. 35 The result may be less reasoned36decision-making, and
efficiency in the courts is not worth that sacrifice.
Because of the ways in which non-publication impacts the precedential
system, it has actually been responsible for hindering progress rather than
promoting efficiency, a point which the Eighth Circuit also neglected to
mention. Under Rule 28A(i) and similar rules, 37 a court is able to prede30. Arnold, 1 J. App. P. PR. at 221.
31. Marion Oliver, Rule 90: The Limited Publication Controversy,TEX. TECH L. REV.
929, 940 (1995).
32. Id. at 952.
33. Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publica,
tion, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109, 124 (1995); see also
Weirich v. Weirich, 867 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. 1993) (Justice Enoch, writing for the Supreme Court of Texas, cited cost-cutting as his primary reason for supporting the practice
of using unpublished opinions).
34. Slavitt, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 125.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. For example, the precedential value of unpublished opinions is limited in the First
Circuit by lST CIR. R. 36(2)(F), in the Fifth Circuit by 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4, and in the Sev-
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termine which opinions will be available as precedent, draining potentially important cases of their legal authority. 38 Removing cases from the
precedential domain severely handicaps a lawyer's ability to rely on the
volume of cases for greater impact and to understand the trends in a
court's decision-making. 39 If, for example, ten cases have been decided in
the same way and nine are unpublished, both attorney and court may not
realize that a clear answer to the question at hand exists before going
through an expensive and time-consuming lawsuit.40 Thus, rather than
improving the efficiency of the court system, non-citation rules could actually strain the court system by causing courts to reestablish the same
rules multiple times.
Finally, Anastasoff includes a quotation by Justice Joseph Story in
which he speaks of the value of precedent and the "tyranny and arbitrary
power" of judges that take over when it is not followed. 4 1 But this is not
merely a theory set out in a historical text, and the Eighth Circuit should
have mentioned some examples of what has already occurred, even if not
singling out specific courts. 42 For example, non-publication may conceal
issues from public view entirely. California hid behind non-publication
when it left an anti-abortion activists' rights case unpublished.4 3 Also, in
Johnson v. Knable, the Fourth Circuit took the bold step of granting
44
homosexuals enhanced protection under the Equal Protection Clause.
While the low profile of an unpublished opinion allowed the Fourth Circuit to expand more protection to homosexuals, it also robbed it of its
precedential value and likely kept it from being reviewed by the Supreme
Court.45 As an unpublished opinion may not be cited as precedent, it will
not be held up to frequent review by the courts and may quietly fade
46
away.
Many lawyers have experienced that most hollow of victories: finding
the perfect case which, however, happens to be unpublished. Rules alenth Circuit by 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(2). Many other circuits limit the use of unpublished
decisions in like manner.
38. Arnold, 1 J. App. P. PR. at 223.
39. Charles Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the
Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy, 50 S.C.

L. REV. 235, 250-251 (1998).
40. This phenomenon is especially problematic in the case of higher courts, where it is
imperative that the court give guidance to the lower courts on difficult issues. Id. at 248.
41. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.
42. The Eighth Circuit might have given some examples of how "repeat players" in the
court system use non-publication to their advantage, spending resources to make sure that
key negative opinions do not become precedent. Carpenter, 50 S.C. L. REV at 252-253.
However, given the Eighth Circuit's unconstitutionality argument, it was more concerned
with abuse of the system by the judiciary.
43. Slavitt, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 128. Id. at 129.
44. Id. at 110 (citing Johnson v. Knable, No. 88-7729, WL 119136 (4th Cir. Oct. 31,
1988).
45. Id.
46. As the public already has such a distrust for the judiciary as a counter-majoritarian
institution, removing layers of judicial review could have a devastating effect on the American legal system. Slavitt, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 130.
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lowing selective publication are widespread in the U.S., 4 7 and this opinion, the first of its kind, could send shockwaves through the legal
community. Even though Anastasoff did not discuss many issues that
would defeat any efficiency justification advanced against claims of unconstitutionality, other courts know they exist through critics' writings.
Anastasoff may have provided just the type of publicity this issue needs,
and litigation over non-publication will likely occur in other circuit courts
in the near future. The results of this litigation will likely be varied; for
every judge that agrees with the Eighth Circuit, there will be one who is
clinging to non-publication as a source of power. If circuits split, the Supreme Court will be grappling with the issue of non-publication in a few
short years. Anastasoff, written in the Supreme Court's complex code of
high-minded constitutional principles, could be a blueprint of the future
Court's opinion.

47. In Texas, Rule 47.7 (formerly Rule 90) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
allows non-publication. TEX. R. App. P. 47.7. Unpublished opinions may be cited in court,
but not as binding authority. This rule has stirred up controversy, which ultimately forced
the Supreme Court of Texas to discuss publication in Weirich v. Weirich, 867 S.W.2d 787
(Tex. 1993). Presumably, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals would find that standard,
too, unconstitutional, but the Texas Supreme Court has allowed the rule to stand.

